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COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM
The unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals in the instant opinion
is well within the principle quoted above from the Winters case. Although the
rationale would not seem to be subject to dispute of any substantial legal significance, it is likely that research would disclose numerous local ordinances
which would run afoul of the Diaz decision. 51
Statute Unconstitutional for Vagueness
In People v.Firth,52 the Court of Appeals was confronted with the constitutionality of a traffic law which provided:
No person shall operate a motor vehicle or a motor cycle upon a
public highway at such speed as to endanger the life, limb or property
of any person, nor at a rate of speed greater than will permit such person to bring the vehicle to a stop without injury to another or his prop53

erty.

Defendant driver struck a child causing serious personal injuries, and was
subsequently charged and convicted of violating the above statute.
In unanimously affirming the judgment of the lower appellate court 4
which had reversed the conviction, the Court of Appeals held that the statute
neither set forth a sufficient definition of criminal conduct nor contained an ascertainable standard by which a judge or jury could measure a driver's conduct. The Court pointed out that notwithstanding a violation of the statute
was only a so-called "traffic infraction",5 5 the statute's constitutional status was
to be determined by the usual rules of criminal law.5"
In construing the statute the Court analyzed each of its prohibitory provisions separately. As to the first prohibition, it pointed out that any speed
would be capable of endangering life, limb or property; while a fair reading
of the statute's second prohibition would indicate that any driver who could
not stop his car in time to avoid an accident would, ipso facto, be driving at an
51. E.g. BUFFALO, N. Y., CITY ORDINANCES, ch. IX, §16, provides:
. . . [n]o person shall idly sit, stand or lounge upon or in
any street, lane, alley or bridge or park ....

52. 3 N.Y.2d 472, 168 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1957).
53.

N. Y. VEHICLE

AND

TRAFFIC LAW §56, subd. 1.

54. 5 Misc.2d 439, 159 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Cy. Ct. 1957). Accord: People v. Gaebel, 2 Misc.2d 458, 153 N.Y.S.2d 102 (Cy. Ct. 1956); People v. Horowitz, 4 Misc.2d
632, 158 N.Y.S.2d 166 (Cy. Ct. 1956). Contra: People v. Sprague, 204 Misc. 99,
120 N.Y.S.2d 725 (Cy. Ct. 1953); People v. Burkhalder, 203 Misc. 532, 117
N.Y.S.2d 609 (Cy. Ct. 1952). See also Commonwealth v. Pentz, 247 Mass. 500,
143 N.E. 322 (1924).
55. N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW §2, subd. 29.
56. People v. Hildebrandt, 308 N.Y. 397, 126 N.E.2d 377 (1955).
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unlawful speed. Accordingly, the Court concluded, the statute was "too vague
for validity".
Al'hough there was some evidence to support the state's contention that
the statute was intended to be a proscription against "a speed which is greater
than that which is reasonable and prudent under the conditions",5 7 the Court
refused to twist the language of the statute into that meaning. It deemed the
face of the statute to be controlling, r.ot the unexpressed intention of the legislature.
Since the Court rejected the state's interpretation of the statute, the constitutionality of a "negligence" type of statute remains an open question in New
York. However, the greater weight of authority 58 has sustained such statutes
on the ground that the historic support of the common law has provided the
concept of negligence with meaning and boundaries sufficient to enable a person of ordinary intelligence safely to estimate"9 what course of conduct to pursue, and sufficient to provide a standard by which a jury can appraise a defendant's conduct.00
In contrast to the "negligence" type of statute, the inadequacies of the invalidated statute are readily apparent. The latter, in effect, imposes liability
without fault and makes a driver the insurer of public safety. Since, as the
Court pointed out, any speed is capable of endangering life, limb or properly,
a person would have to discontinue driving in order to completely avoid the
reach of this statute.
Municipal Regulation of Transport and Dumping of Garbage
The Town of Somers,
ordinance prohibiting the
garbage originating outside
a private dump within the
57.

acting pursuant to statutory authority, 1 enacted an
transportation and dumping within the town of
the town. The plaintiff, who had been operating
township with a collection area embracing several

GOVERNOR'S CONFERENcE REPORT ON "HIGHWAY AND T.ArFFIc SAFETY,

p. 22

(1940).
58. See State v. Wojahn, 204 Or. 84, 282 P.2d 675 (1955), which is a good
review of legislation in this area. Also see People v. Grogan, 260 N.Y. 138, 183
N.E. 273 (1932).
59. Wash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913), Holmes J.:
[T~he law is full of instances where a man's fate depends
on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury substquently
estimates it, some matter of degree.
60. People v. McMurchy, 294 Mich. 47, 228 N.W. 723, 734 (1930):
The term "negligence" is so well known, the elements so
certain, the definitions so definitely settled, and the precedents so many, that there is nothing indefinite whatsoever

about it.

61. N. Y.

TOWN LAw

§130(6).

